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"Does This Hurt?": Constitutional Challenges of Damage
Caps and the Review Panel Process in Medical
Malpractice Actions in Louisiana
I. INTRODUCTION
For the past two decades, the United States has wrestled with what
some call the "medical malpractice crisis." This crisis was caused by
an increase in the number of malpractice suits filed against physicians
as well as the corresponding increase in malpractice insurance premiums
which physicians subsequently faced. This combination of malpractice
suits and malpractice insurance premium increases forced many physi-
cians to abandon their specialty, to pass the increased cost of insurance
premiums to their patients, or to in effect self-insure themselves.
Faced with this crisis, several states, including Louisiana, passed
legislation that places a cap on the amount of monetary damages award-
able to a victim of medical malpractice.' In an effort to reduce the
number of medical malpractice suits brought against physicians, the
Louisiana legislature limited the amount of monetary damages recov-
erable in such suits. In addition to providing insulation against excessive
damage awards, the legislation was also intended to alleviate problems
encountered by physicians in acquiring medical malpractice insurance by
stabilizing the rates of such insurance.
Questions, however, regarding the constitutionality of such legislation
have arisen. This comment will focus on the constitutionality of sta-
tutorily imposed limitations on recovery for medical malpractice claims
and the process by which medical malpractice victims must submit their
claims to a medical review panel before a court can render a judgement
regarding compensation. Specifically, this work will emphasize how the
United States Supreme Court, Louisiana courts, and courts of other
states address these issues.
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II. CAPS ON DAMAGE AwARDs
A. Lack of Substantial Federal Question
In Fein v. Permanente Medical Group,2 the constitutionality of
limiting recovery for medical malpractice actions reached the United
States Supreme Court. The case involved the constitutionality of Cali-
fornia's statute limiting recovery for non-economic losses, such as pain
and suffering, to $250,000.1 With three dissents, the California Supreme
Court found that the imposed limitation on recovery did not violate
the Equal Protection or Due Process clauses of the United States Con-
stitution. Upon this finding, the plaintiff-appellants appealed to the
United States Supreme Court. Impliedly, the California Supreme Court
did not consider equal protection or due process claims under the Cal-
ifornia State Constitution.
In a one sentence opinion issued in Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group,4 the United States Supreme Court stated: "The appeal is dis-
missed for want of a substantial federal question." 5 Therefore, based
upon the denial of the appeal, one might conclude by implication that
the United States Supreme Court does not believe that caps on non-
economic losses regarding medical malpractice awards violate equal pro-
tection or due process aspects of the United States Constitution.
Justice White, however, registered a vigorous dissent over the denial
of the writ. As Justice White stated, California joined Indiana as one
of only two states upholding the constitutionality of damage limitations
of this type.6 In summarizing his dissent, Justice White said:
Whether due process requires a legislatively enacted compensa-
tion scheme to be a quid pro quo for the common-law or state-
law remedy it replaces, and if so, how adequate it must be,
thus appears to be an issue unresolved by this Court, and one
which is dividing the appellate and highest courts of several
states. The issue is important, and is deserving of this Court's
review. Moreover, given the continued national concern over the
"malpractice crisis," it is likely that more states will enact similar
types of limitations, and that the issue will recur. I find, there-
fore, that the federal question presented by this appeal is sub-
2. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (Cal. 1985).
3. Cal. Civ. Code § 3333.2 (West Supp. 1991).
4. 474 U.S. 892, 106 S. Ct. 214 (1985).
5. Id. at 892, 106 S. Ct. at 214.
6. Id. at 893, 106 S. Ct. at 215. The opinion was issued in 1985. As of the
publication date of the opinion, Texas, New Hampshire, North Dakota and Ohio had
found similar statutes unconstitutional on federal constitutional grounds.
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stantial, and dissent from the Court's conclusion to the contrary. 7
As Justice White predicted, the issue of the constitutionality of
capping medical malpractice awards has recurred among the courts of
several additional states, including Louisiana. However, because it ap-
pears that the United States Supreme Court will not consider the issue
for lack of a substantial federal question, the importance of the inter-
pretation of the constitutionality of such legislation by state courts is
greatly increased. With this consideration in mind, an examination of
the Louisiana statutes capping awards for medical malpractice actions
and state court interpretations of their constitutionality is appropriate.
B. Louisiana Statutes and Judicial Interpretation
Louisiana law provides that the total amount recoverable, exclusive
of future medical care, for all malpractice claims shall not exceed
$500,000. 8 Until April 1, 1990, no eligible health care provider was
responsible for any amount in excess of $100,000 for injuries or death
to any one patient that resulted from any act of malpractice. 9 However,
the Louisiana legislature recently amended this section so that the health
care provider is now responsible for legal interest on the amount up to
$100,000.10 The remainder of any award in excess of $100,000 is payable
from the Louisiana Patients Compensation Fund (LPCF)." The Act
impliedly limits the total amount payable from the LPCF to $400,000.12
Claimants have challenged the statutory limitation placed on recovery
for acts of medical malpractice on equal protection grounds. Specifically,
the language of the state constitutional clause regarding equal protection
reads as follows:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No
law shall discriminate against a person because of race or re-
ligious ideas, beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall arbitrarily,
capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person be-
cause of birth, age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political
ideas or affiliations. Slavery and involuntary servitude are pro-
hibited, except in the latter case as punishment for crime. 3
7. Id. at 894-95, 106 S. Ct. at 216.
8. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(1) (Supp. 1991). The $500,000 amount does not include
amounts for future medical care or related benefits under La. R.S. 40:1299.43.
9. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(2) (Supp. 1991).
10. Id.
11. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(3)(a) (Supp. 1991).
12. La. R.S. 40:1299.42(B)(3)(b) (Supp. 1991).
13. La. Const. art. I, § 3.
1991] 1235
1LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
As Professor Hargrave has pointed out, the 1921 Louisiana Con-
stitution had no equal protection clause. 4 Additionally, this section
expands the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution."5 This addition to the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution demonstrates the Louisiana legislature's intent to increase
protections available to its citizens to a level above that found in the
1921 Louisiana Constitution.
Perhaps the most famous, confusing, and misconstrued opinion re-
garding the constitutionality of caps placed on medical malpractice dam-
age awards arose in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State
University. 6 In Sibley, a 19 year old psychiatric patient at the Louisiana
State University Medical Center in Shreveport, Louisiana suffered mas-
sive brain damage, resulting from an anticholinergic reaction which
caused cardio-pulmonary arrest. 7 The parents of the woman filed suit
against the Board of Supervisors for the woman's injuries.
At this point, a significant aspect of the Sibley case should be noted.
Sibley involved acts of medical malpractice by state employees, as well
as the independent negligence of the Board of Supervisors, but not acts
of medical malpractice by private physicians. The statutory provisions
governing malpractice by state employees and malpractice by private
physicians differ, but each essentially accomplishes the same goals.18
While the goals of capping medical malpractice awards include in-
suring an adequate supply of physicians and stabilizing medical mal-
practice insurance rates, the state also has some self-serving interests.
Of particular importance is the state's interest in protecting its coffers.
Additionally, the state may have considered capping damage awards as
a preferable alternative to the elimination of tort claims against health
care professionals where the state would essentially be forced to step in
and provide medical care to all Qf its citizens. Though these goals seem
to be important considerations, they appear to have had little impact
on the court's decision in Sibley.
In Sibley, the trial court found for the injured claimant, but limited
the liability of the defendant to $500,000 pursuant to the appropriate
medical malpractice statute. The First Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed
14. L. Hargrave, The Louisiana State Constitution, A Reference Guide 23 (1991)
[hereinafter referred to as Hargrave].
15. Hargrave, supra note 14, at 23.
16. 446 So. 2d 760 (La. App. Ist Cir. 1983), aff'd, 462 So. 2d 149, on reh'g, 477
So. 2d 1094 (1985), on remand, 490 So. 2d 307 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 496
So. 2d 325 (1986).
17. 477 So. 2d at 1098.
18. Compare La. R.S. 40:1299.39 (Supp. 1991) concerning malpractice by state actors
with La. R.S. 40:1299.41 et. seq. (Supp. 1991) concerning malpractice by qualified private
health care professionals.
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the decision of the trial court, as did the Louisiana Supreme Court in
its initial hearing. On rehearing, however, the Louisiana Supreme Court
radically changed its initial opinion.
In a majority opinion composed of three concurrences and one
partial concurrence, the Louisiana Supreme Court found that the medical
malpractice award cap did not apply to the independent negligence of
the Board of Supervisors, but rather only to the malpractice of the
physicians or other health care professionals actually rendering the care.
In support of this position, Justice Dennis wrote:
The act clearly does not prohibit or affect judgments based on
the negligence of anyone except physicians and other [health
care] professionals providing medical and related health care
services.
That the legislative aim was so limited is clear from the
careful definition and connection of terms in the statute.19
The court went on to find that the claimant fell within a class of
people disadvantaged by "physical classification" within the meaning of
the statute. The court then remanded the case to the court of appeal
for a determination of the constitutionality of the statute.
Perhaps the most important contribution of Sibley concerned the
pronouncement by the Louisiana Supreme Court that the federal "three-
tier" level of scrutiny (strict, intermediate and minimal) used in deter-
mining the constitutionality of a statute was inappropriate for application
to the Louisiana Constitution. Due to the somewhat vague nature of
the opinion, however, some confusion has arisen as to what method
and level of scrutiny Louisiana courts should apply in determining the
constitutionality of statutes within the framework of the Louisiana Con-
stitution. 20
In the opinion, Justice Dennis hinted at the level of scrutiny he
found applicable, but failed to provide a definitive standard. After
criticizing the "three-tier" federal model, he wrote:
Also, as we will endeavor to demonstrate, the state constitution
calls for more than minimal scrutiny of certain types of clas-
sifications, and assigns the state the burden of showing that
such legislation is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable.2'
19. 477 So. 2d at 1100.
20. Justice Dennis suggests that: "A workable alternative to the multi-level system,
according to a respectable group of scholars and jurists, would be a comprehensive system
based upon the unitary standard announced in Police Depart. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408
U.S. 92, 92 S.Ct. 2286, 33 L.Ed.2d 212 (1972) which in all instances would inquire
whether there is 'an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered' by the govern-
mental action in question." 477 So. 2d at 1107.
21. Id.
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Later, Justice Dennis seemed to apply this analysis to the equal
protection guarantee found in article I, section 3 of the Louisiana State
Constitution. 22 In any light, this author believes that the appropriate
standard for determining the constitutionality of challenged legislation
that restricts an avenue of recovery should be that the state must
affirmatively show that the legislation in question furthers some appro-
priate state interest and is not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable in
nature.
The constitutionality of the cap was subsequently challenged on equal
protection grounds at the appellate level in LaMark v. NME Hospitals,
Inc. 23 In LaMark, a woman suffered hypoxic brain damage2 when she
ceased to breathe for an undetermined period of time while recovering
from surgery. After settling with the hospital for $100,000, the maximum
statutory liability for the hospital, 25 the family sought additional damages
from the LPCF.26 The trial court granted a motion for summary judg-
ment filed by the LPCF stating that the LPCF had paid the total
maximum amount awardable to the plaintiffs ($400,000) together with
applicable interest and costs. The plaintiffs appealed, asserting that the
statute creates a class of claimants treated differently based upon the
number of claimants per act of malpractice. In illustrating this claim,
the court said:
For example, a malpractice victim who is the sole claimant in
a suit and whose damages exceed $500,000.00 recovers the full
limit of $500,000.00. But a malpractice victim with damages
exceeding $500,000.00 whose claim is joined with the claims of
five family members, all based on the same act of malpractice,
recovers substantially less after the $500,000.00 is apportioned
among the claimants. 7
The court noted that the standard of review for challenged legislation
was set forth by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Sibley v. Board of
Supervisors of Louisiana State University.2 The court further noted that
22. Id.
23. 542 So. 2d 753 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1989).
24. Hypoxia, as defined by Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary (26th ed. 1981)
is the reduction of oxygen supply to tissue below physiological levels despite adequate
perfusion of the tissue by blood.
25. See supra text accompanying note 9.
26. La. R.S. 40:1299.42 (1977 and Supp. 1991).
27. 542 So. 2d at 755.
28. 477 So.2d 1094 (La. 1985). The standard set forth was as follows:
Article I, Section 3 commands the courts to decline enforcement of a legislative
classification of individuals in three different situations: (1) When the law
classifies individuals by race or religious beliefs, it shall be repudiated completely;
(2) When the statute classifies persons on the basis of birth, age, sex, culture,
physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations, its enforcement shall be
1238 [Vol. 51
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the statute did not classify individuals by race, religious beliefs, birth,
age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political beliefs.2 9 Therefore, it
was incumbent upon the plaintiffs to prove that the statute did not
further some appropriate state interest. The court stated that the plaintiffs
failed to satisfy this burden of proof.30 The court also found that the
statute furthered the purpose of providing affordable medical care for
citizens of the state.
Furthermore, the court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the sta-
tutorily imposed cap should apply to a single act of malpractice rather
than for all acts of malpractice involving a single patient. The court
stated that the language of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.42(B)(1)
makes it clear that its limitation applies to all claims by one patient.
Citing Louisiana Civil Code article 9, the court then held that the clear
language of the law should not be ignored in search of the intent of
the legislature."
Shortly after the LaMark case, the Louisiana Supreme Court re-
considered the issue of medical malpractice claim caps in Williams v.
Kushner.2 In Williams, a father brought suit against a physician for
permanent injuries sustained by his infant at birth. Prior to trial, the
plaintiff-father settled with the attending physician for the amount of
$100,000. After a jury trial on the issue of quantum, the jury returned
an unitemized verdict in the amount of $1,829,000 against the LPCF. 3
After a hearing, the trial court reduced the award against the LPCF to
$400,000 in accordance with the applicable statute.
The plaintiff appealed the trial court's award reduction. Subse-
quently, the court of appeal affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The Louisiana Supreme Court granted writs of certiorari to review the
decision.3 4
In a per curiam opinion, the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the
constitutionality of the limitation of recovery from the LPCF. The court
apparently considered the fund a state-run insurance company. In the
court's opinion, this classification entitles the state to limit its liability
in any amount it wishes." Furthermore, the court added that the LPCF
refused unless the state or other advocate of the classification shows that the
classification has a reasonable basis; (3) When the law classifies individuals on
any other basis, it shall be rejected whenever a member of a disadvantaged
class shows that it does not suitably further any appropriate state interest.
477 So. 2d at 1107-08.
29. 542 So. 2d at 755.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 756.
32. 549 So. 2d 294 (La. 1989) (reh'g denied).
33. Id. at 295.
34. Williams v. Kushner, 526 So. 2d 785 (La. 1988).
35. 549 So. 2d at 296. The court cited a 1988 decision of the Supreme Court of
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exists as an affirmative act of the legislature providing supplemental
recovery to victims of medical malpractice and is therefore not subject
to the constitutional analysis set forth in Sibley.16 Hence, the court found
that restricting a medical malpractice victim's recovery from the LPCF
to $400,000 is constitutional.
In an interesting twist, the court briefly speculated as to the con-
stitutionality of limiting recovery against a health care provider to $100,000
within a general tort compensation scheme. In its opinion, as well as
in an attached appendix, the court discussed how other states have
addressed this vexing issue.17 The court eventually declined to address
the issue, deeming it inappropriate to decide this particular question as
the plaintiff's suit against the physician had already been settled for
$100,000. Therefore, the issue of the constitutionality of limiting the
individual liability of qualified health care providers to $100,000 remains
unsettled in Louisiana.
The final issue addressed by the court in Williams dealt with the
availability of future medical expenses. Specifically, the Louisiana leg-
islature provided in 1984 that all future medical expenses would remain
excluded from the $500,000 cap in the private sector.3" This section
applied to all claims filed "on or after" September 1, 1984. 39 The
Louisiana legislature passed a similar provision in 1985 that applies to
medical malpractice claims against the stateA0 In this case, the mother
gave birth to the infant, who sustained injury, before the legislature
passed the provision applicable to private health care providers in 1984.
Therefore, because of time and place of birth, the statute deemed the
infant ineligible to collect benefits for future medical expenses.
Kansas in supporting its logic:
Because the Fund is a state-run insurance company, the State is free to limit
its liability in any amount it wishes. The issue presented here is one of limiting
the liability of the tortfeasor, namely the negligent health care provider. Kansas
Malpractice Victims v. Bell, 243 Kan. 333, 757 P.2d 251, 256 (1988).
36. 549 So. 2d at 296.
37. The court cited Fein v. Permanente Medical Group, 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d
665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985) [California]; Johnson v. St. Vincent Hospital, 273 Ind.
374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980) [Indiana]-after which Louisiana's statute is modeled; Pren-
dergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977) [Nebraska]; and Etheridge v.
Medical Center Hosps., 237 Va. 87, 376 S.E.2d 525 (1989) [Virginia], as standing for the
proposition that such a statute is constitutional. The court also cited Jones v. State Bd.
of Medicine, 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976) [Idaho]; Wright v. Central Du Page
Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976) [Illinois]; Kansas Malpractice Victims
Coalition v. Bell, 243 Kan. 333, 757 P.2d 251 (1988) [Kansas]; Carson v. Maurer, 120
N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825, 837 (1980) [New Hampshire]; Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d
125 (N.D. 1978) [North Dakota]; and Lucas v. U.S., 757 S.W.2d 687 (1988) [Texas] as
standing for the proposition that this type of statute is unconstitutional.
38. 1984 La. Acts No. 435, § 1299.43(A).
39. Id.
40. 1985 La. Acts No. 239, § 1299.39(B)(2).
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The Louisiana Supreme Court noted that because the infant birth
occurred in a private hospital rather than a state hospital, the act placed
future medical benefits in a different category.4' Specifically, the court
wrote:
This anomaly is a clear violation of the Louisiana constitutional
guarantee of equal protection.
Despite wording to the contrary, Act 435 of 1984 must be
reformed to apply to claims and litigation pending when it was
passed. Plaintiff here is entitled to a judgment for the benefits
provided .42
Therefore, the court did not allow the disparity in treatment between
infants born in private versus public hospitals to stand.
All of the justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court did not share
in the majority opinion expressed in Williams. While concurring in part
with the overall result, Justice Marcus registered a partial dissent stating
that he disagreed with the interpretation of Act 435 of 1984. Quite
simply, Justice Marcus expressed the opinion that he found no violation
of the state's equal protection clause by the Act.
Additionally, Chief Justice Dixon and Justice Dennis dissented from
the result reached by the majority. Chief Justice Dixon, in a dissent
several times longer than the Court's per curiam opinion, engaged in a
logical and well-written opinion discussing the constitutionality of the
cap on medical malpractice awards with regard to claims of denial of
equal protection and denial of access to the courts.
Chief Justice Dixon found that the statute, capping recovery in
medical malpractice claims, "substantially furthers" several legitimate
state purposes.43 These purposes, as identified by the Chief Justice, are
the prevention of hospital closures, restriction of physician practice, and
containment of rising health care costs." While recognizing that the
statute does differentiate between victims of medical malpractice based
upon their injuries, he found this discrimination neither arbitrary, ca-
pricious nor unreasonable, and therefore not violative of the equal
protection guarantee found in article I, section 3 of the Louisiana State
Constitution.45
However, Chief Justice Dixon then engaged in a discussion con-
cerning whether the statutorily imposed cap remains violative of the
Louisiana State Constitution's guarantee of access to the court system.
41. Williams v. Kushner, 549 So. 2d 294, 297 (La. 1989).
42. Id. at 297.
43. Id. at 308 (Dixon, C.J., dissenting).
44. Id.
45. Id.
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Specifically, this provision is found in article I, section 22 of the state
constitution and states:
All courts shall be open, and every person shall have an adequate
remedy by due process of law and justice, administered without
denial, partiality, or unreasonable delay, for injury to him in
his person, property, reputation, or other rights.
In arguing that the precepts found in this section trace their roots
to the Magna Carta,4 Chief Justice Dixon balanced what he viewed as
the right to free access to courts versus the interest of the state in
alleviating the malpractice crisis. In his opinion, despite the reasona-
bleness of the legislature in passing such a statute, Chief Justice Dixon
found that the statute does violate the right of free access to courts.
Therefore, he advocates the striking of the statute. However, as Professor
Hargrave has indicated, this position is in direct contrast to the opinion
of the Louisiana Supreme Court previously expressed in Sibley.47 Oddly,
Chief Justice Dixon joined as one of the two concurring justices in the
final Louisiana Supreme Court hearing of Sibley.48
Justice Dennis, in his dissent in Williams, chastised the court for
failing to answer the true question the court granted certiorari to answer
in the first place. Instead of addressing the cap on malpractice claims,
Justice Dennis stated that the court had "gratuitously declare[d] un-
constitutional" a group of persons claiming medical expenses without
analysis.49 Specifically, Justice Dennis expressed concern regarding the
fact that the court did not reveal the level of constitutional scrutiny to
which it subjected the state statute. Furthermore, he maintained that
the court did not identify the particular classification that it found
violative of the equal protection clause ° or give the proponents of such
legislation an opportunity to demonstrate that the statute serves a valid
purpose.
As Justice Dennis explained, persons with claims against the state
are often treated differently than those who have claims against private
parties." His concerns seemed to focus upon the legislature's ability to
alter or create legislation without giving the legislation retroactive effect.
Specifically, he said:
46. Id.
47. Hargrave, supra note 14, at 42.
48. Sibley v. Board of Supervisors of Louisiana State University, 477 So.2d 1094
(La. 1985).
49. 549 So. 2d at 313 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
50. Id.
51. Id. Specifically, Justice Dennis refers to La. R.S. 9:2800 (1991) (state not liable
under La. Civ. Code art. 2317 absent actual knowledge); La. R.S. 13:5105 (1991) (no
jury trial against the state); La. R.S. 13:5106 (1991) (general damages limited to $500,000)
as examples of how different classes of persons are treated by the state.
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The Court's cryptic pronouncement casts a shadow of consti-
tutional doubt on these and other statutes, as well as the leg-
islature's ability to change prescriptive periods, create new causes
of action, and enhance statutory benefits and entitlements with-
out making such acts retroactive.5 2
Thus, Justice Dennis seemed to indicate that his concerns do not
focus solely upon caps for medical malpractice claims, but rather upon
the legislative process as a whole. As of this date, however, the challenges
described by Justice Dennis have not materialized, and the constitu-
tionality of the provision capping claims for medical malpractice seems
intact.
With the dissents of Justices Dixon, Marcus and Dennis, as well as
the length of time the case stayed before the court for consideration
prior to the rendering of a decision, the true precedential value of
Williams remains questionable. Additionally, the recent retirement of
Chief Justice Dixon leaves questions as to how his successor will view
the constitutionality of the malpractice cap. Therefore, while the cap
on damage awards for acts of medical malpractice presently enjoys
constitutional protection, the Louisiana Supreme Court has failed to
definitively address the issue. It remains possible, though somewhat
unlikely, that the Louisiana Supreme Court could eventually find the
medical malpractice award cap to be unconstitutional, especially in light
of the future composition of the court.
III. THE MEDICAL REvIEw PANEL PROCESS
Before any action for medical malpractice may proceed to court, a
plaintiff must first submit his claim to a medical review panel." The
panel consists of three health care professionals who hold unrestricted
licenses to practice their profession and one attorney. 4 The respective
parties may agree upon the attorney member of the panel, or alterna-
tively, if the parties cannot reach agreement as to the attorney member,
the statute provides a process for arbitrary selection of an attorney."
The attorney acts as chairman of the panel, but possesses no vote with
regard to panel findings.16
The panel may request such information as it deems necessary before
it expresses its expert opinion as to whether the evidence submitted
supports the allegation that the defendant or defendants failed to act
52. Id.
53. La. R.S. 40:1299.47(A) (Supp. 1991). However, use of the medical review panel
may be waived if agreed to by both of the respective parties.
54. La. R.S. 40:1299.47(C) (Supp. 1991).
55. Id.
56. La. R.S. 40:1299.47(C)(2) (Supp. 1991).
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within the appropriate standard." However, the panel may issue an
opinion that a material issue of fact not requiring an expert opinion
exists, but nevertheless, the court should consider the issue since it bears
upon liability."' The statute deems the conclusions reached by the medical
review panel admissible in any court of law.59 The panel's findings,
however, are not deemed conclusive, and either party has the right to
call any member of the panel as a witness. °
Plaintiffs have assailed as unconstitutional the requirement that an
injured plaintiff first submit a claim to a medical review panel before
commencing action in any court. This issue has been the subject of as
much, if not more, litigation, as the issue of the constitutionality of the
limit on recovery for medical malpractice claims. This section of the
comment will focus on how Louisiana courts have addressed the con-
stitutionality of the statute requiring a plaintiff to first submit a claim
for medical malpractice to a medical review panel prior to commencing
an action in court.
A. Denial of Equal Protection
As previously noted, the Louisiana State Constitution of 1974 con-
tains an equal protection clause. 6' The earliest challenge to the medical
review panel on equal protection grounds arose in Everett v. Goldman. 62
In Everett, a plaintiff brought a medical malpractice suit against phy-
sicians, their medical clinic and respective insurers. The physicians chal-
lenged the suit for prematurity on the grounds that the plaintiff did
not submit his claim to the appropriate medical review panel before
initiating suit in trial court. The trial court dismissed the exception of
prematurity and declared provisions of the Medical Malpractice Act,
including the requirement that plaintiffs first submit all claims to a
medical review panel, unconstitutional.
The Louisiana Supreme Court vacated the findings of the trial court
with regard to the medical review panel and specifically upheld the
constitutionality of those provisions. While the court did consider claims
of due process and denial of access to courts, the court focused primarily
on the challenge of the statute on denial of equal protection grounds.
57. Id.
58. La. R.S. 40:1299.47(G)(3) (1977).
59. La. R.S. 40:1299.47(H) (1977).
60. Id. Interestingly, and quite appropriately, the statute gives immunity to the panel
members with respect to opinions expressed in their official capacity regarding the work
performed by the health care provider.
61. For text of La. Const. art. I, § 3, see supra text accompanying note 13.
62. 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978).
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As Justice Calogero said, the court considered this claim the most
significant. 63
The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of the statute in Everett
by asserting that the statute required victims of medical malpractice
treated by health care providers covered under the applicable statute to
convene a medical review panel, while the statute did not require victims
of medical malpractice treated by non-qualified health care providers to
convene a medical review panel. Additionally, the plaintiff asserted that
persons treated by qualified health care providers could not plead a
specific amount of damages according to the statute while those who
received treatment from a non-qualified health care provider could plead
a specific amount of damages. The plaintiff asserted that a choice by
a physician to qualify or not under the statute directly affects the patient;
yet the physician was not required to notify the patient of the choice. 64
Justice Calogero engaged in a discussion of the process involved in
determining whether a statute will withstand a constitutional challenge.
However, Everett arose some seven years before the Louisiana Supreme
Court opinion in Sibley, so the analysis engaged in by Justice Calogero
revolved primarily around the analytical procedure employed by the
United States Supreme Court in determining the constitutionality of such
a statute.65 Primarily, the analysis focused on whether the issue involves
a fundamental right, and if it does not, whether a rational basis supports
the discriminatory treatment the legislature seeks to advance." As es-
tablished by Justice Calogero, the statute requiring submission of a claim
to a medical review panel does not affect a fundamental right or create
a suspect classification. 67 As such, applying the "compelling state in-
terest" test is inappropriate. Instead, a lesser test, whether the statute
furthers a valid purpose, is the proper standard. 61 In affirming the
constitutionality of the statute under the "reasonable basis" test, Justice
Calogero said:
The valid state purpose said to be served by the two provisions
of the medical malpractice act before us is the lowering of the
63. Id. at 1265.
64. Id.
65. Justice Calogero used such cases as Belle Terre v. Borras, 416 U.S. 1, 94 S. Ct.
1536 (1974); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S. Ct. 1278 (1973);
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95, 92 S. Ct. 2286, 2290 (1972); and
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 89 S. Ct. 1322 (1969) to assist in the interpretation
of the constitutionality of the statute.
66. 359 So. 2d at 1266.
67. Id. However, this position seems somewhat inconsistent with the court's later
position in Sibley in which Justice Dennis found a suspect class based on physical condition.
The reader must keep in mind that Everett concerns the constitutionality of the medical
review panel process while Sibley addresses caps on medical malpractice awards.
68. Id.
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cost of health care generally and the assuring of available medical
care for the citizens of the state. We cannot say that the two
challenged provisions of the act adopted by the legislature rep-
resent an unreasonable response to the medical malpractice prob-
lem. Nor are the provisions especially far reaching.6
As the court stated, the requirement that a plaintiff first submit a
claim to a malpractice review panel seems to be a rational effort to
achieve a plausible goal. 70
Various Louisiana courts of appeal have consistently followed the
holding of Everett. In Hodge v. Lafayette General Hospital,7' a plaintiff
asserted that the legislative bar on suits that exists until the medical
review panel renders an opinion violated his constitutional right to due
process and equal protection. Citing Everett, the court of appeal rejected
the plaintiff's argument and found no violation of the right to due
process or equal protection guaranteed in the Louisiana Constitution.7 2
In Aston v. Lazarus,73 a plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of
the entire Medical Malpractice Act on the basis of denial of due process
and equal protection. The plaintiff in Aston cited decisions of several
courts of other jurisdictions holding the same or similar provisions in
other states unconstitutional. 74 While the court recognized the potential
persuasiveness of these authorities, it also noted that the Louisiana
Supreme Court had previously addressed this issue and had found the
Act to be constitutional. Therefore, they remained bound, as the court
declared, to follow the prior decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court
and uphold the constitutionality of the Act. 7
Most recently, the statutory requirement of initial scrutiny by a
medical review panel was challenged as violative of the equal protection
clause in Jarrell v. American Medical International, Inc.76 The plaintiff
in Jarrell asserted that the statute violated her right to equal protection
because it split medical malpractice claimants into different classes based
upon their physical condition-those treated by qualified health care
providers covered under the Act, and those treated by health care
providers not covered under the Act.77
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1267.
71. 399 So. 2d 744 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
72. Id. at 747.
73. 439 So. 2d 1240 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1983).
74. Id. at 1242. Cited were decisions from Florida, Missouri, Idaho and California
as being dispositive on the issue.
75. Id.
76. 552 So. 2d 756 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1989), writ denied, 556 So. 2d 1282 (1990).
77. Id. at 757-58. While the headnotes of the case indicate that there is no violation
of equal protection under the Louisiana State Constitution or the United States Consti-
1246 [Vol. 51
COMMENTS
The court noted that the Louisiana Supreme Court in Sibley rejected
as inappropriate the traditional three-level system of scrutiny developed
by the United States Supreme Court for application to Louisiana equal
protection considerations. The court then proceeded to state that the
statute did not create a classification based on physical condition or
any other category specifically enumerated in the state equal protection
clause. 78 Therefore, the court determined that the classification existed
outside of the scope of the equal protection clause and should be upheld
unless the plaintiff was able to prove that the statute did not further
any appropriate state interest.
79
B. Denial of Access to Courts
As previously mentioned, the Louisiana Supreme Court addressed
the challenge to the submission of claims to a medical review panel on
the basis of denial of access to courts in Everett.80 As the court in
Everett pointed out, unless the claimant asserts a right deemed "fun-
damental," access to courts may be restricted if a rational basis for
that restriction exists.8" Holding the right of a medical malpractice claim-
ant to recover for damages to be non-fundamental, the court chose to
apply the lesser "rational basis" test in determining the constitutionality
of the statute. 2 After considering the intended purposes of the medical
review panel, the court found that the statute did not unreasonably
restrict access of claimants to the courts.
As Professor Hargrave has noted, the section of the 1974 Louisiana
Constitution which guarantees access to the courts generally repeats
article I, section 6 of the 1921 Louisiana Constitution and some consider
it a second due process clause.83 Additionally, Professor Hargrave has
pointed out that some claimants have attempted to use this section to
challenge caps on statutorily imposed damage awards in other situa-
tions.8 4 However, such challenges have unequivocally failed and no re-
ported state case has found that statutorily imposed review panels violate
the constitutional guarantee of access to courts.
tution, the court only engaged in consideration of state constitutional claims. Therefore,
I presume this decision should be regarded as being dispositive on the issue of state
constitutional law claims only.
78. Id. at 758.
79. Id.
80. See supra text accompanying note 51.
81. Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1268 (La. 1978).
82. Id. at 1268-69.
83. Hargrave, supra note 14, at 42.
84. Id.
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C. Denial of Due Process of Law
Louisiana's due process clause can be found in article I, section 3
of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution. It simply states: "No person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, except by due process of law."
Plaintiffs have used this clause to challenge the constitutionality of the
statutorily imposed requirement of submission of a medical malpractice
claim to a medical review panel prior to trial.
The United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals first addressed
the issue in Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc." In its analysis, the
court announced its agreement with the findings of the Louisiana Su-
preme Court in that the right of a victim of medical malpractice to sue
for damages in tort is not a fundamental right. 6 In upholding the
statute, the court wrote:
The legislation we review has not been shown to be unreasonable,
either on its face or as applied. The statutes were enacted to
meet a perceived crisis in medical care-to maintain the avail-
ability of malpractice insurance at acceptable rates. Such is a
permissible government objective. 87
Later, the Louisiana First Circuit Court of Appeal addressed the
issue in Wyble v. St. Luke General Hospital.8 In Wyble, plaintiffs
brought suit for injuries sustained at a hospital when an employee tripped
over medical equipment dislodging an intravenous needle located in the
victim's arm.8 9 The plaintiffs complained that the requirement that they
submit their claims to a medical review panel prior to filing suit in
court violated their constitutional right to due process of law.
The court in Wyble rejected the contentions of the plaintiffs. Citing
Everett, the court pointed out that the medical review panel did not
interfere with the right of the plaintiffs to proceed with a jury trial.
The court noted that the ultimate issue of liability and quantum went
to the jury in a civil trial. Considering this set of circumstances, the
court found that the statute did not deny due process of law.
IV. THE 1990 AMENDMENTS
In the 1990 legislative session, the Louisiana legislature made sig-
nificant changes to the Medical Malpractice Act.9 One primary change
involved the administration of the LPCF. The other major change
85. 660 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1981).
86. Id. at 150-51.
87. Id. at 151.
88. 415 So. 2d 622 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982).
89. Id. at 623.
90. 1990 La. Acts No. 967.
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mandated that, at the time it renders its expert opinion, the medical
review panel issue written reasons regarding the presence or absence of
facts which may confirm the presence of malpractice. This section of
the comment examines these changes and the likely effect they will have
on the cap for medical malpractice damage awards, as well as the medical
review panel process.
A. Possible Loss of the $500,000 Cap
From its inception, administration of the LPCF rested with the state
of Louisiana through the Commissioner of Insurance. 91 Additionally,
responsibility for defending the LPCF rested with the Attorney General,
who could enter into contracts with private firms for defense of the
Fund. 92 However, on October 1, 1990, responsibility for the adminis-
tration and defense of the LPCF shifted to the Louisiana Patient's
Compensation Oversight Board.
The Patient's Compensation Fund Oversight Board was created by
the amendments to the Act. 93 The Board consists of nine members, eight
of whom represent member health care providers and one of whom
represents the insurance industry. 9' The members are appointed by the
Governor subject to confirmation by the Senate. 95 The Board now has
the responsibility for administering and defending the Fund, duties pre-
viously held by the state.96 The concept of having private individuals,
as opposed to state officials, administering and defending the fund,
however, is thought by many to threaten the loss of the constitutionally
protected cap on medical malpractice awards.
A recent article reported that both the Attorney General and the
Commissioner of Insurance believe that private administration of the
LPCF will endanger the $500,000 cap on damage awards for medical
malpractice actions. 97 The same article also reported the view expressed
by the Attorney General that the only reason the courts have found
the statutorily imposed cap permissible was because the LPCF operated
as a state-run fund. 98
While at first glance this argument might possess merit, closer scru-
tiny reveals a possible flaw in the argument's logic. The last sentence
of Louisiana Revised Statutes 40:1299.44(A)(1) reads as follows:
91. La. R.S. 40:1299.44(A)(5)(b) (Supp 1990).
92. La. R.S. 40:1299.44(A)(5)(c)-(d) (Supp. 1990).
93. La. R.S. 40:1299.44(D) (Supp. 1991).
94. La. R.S. 40:1299.44(D)(l)(b) (Supp. 1991).
95. La. R.S. 40:1299.44(D) (Supp. 1991).
96. La. R.S. 1299.44(D)(2)(a) (Supp. 1991).
97. Control of Malpractice Fund Contested, Baton Rouge Morning Advocate, Sep-
tember 4, 1990, at 10A, col. 5.
98. Id.
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The state recognizes and acknowledges that the fund and any
income from it are not public monies, but rather are private
monies which shall be held in trust as a custodial fund by the
state for the use, benefit, and protection of medical malpractice
claimants and the fund's private health care provider members,
and all of such funds and income earned from investing the
private monies comprising the corpus of this fund shall be subject
to use and disposition only as provided by this Section."
From the language of this section it is readily apparent that the
state recognizes the monies in the LPCF as private funds while it acts
as a "trust" custodian. Furthermore, all expenses of collecting, pro-
tecting, and administering the fund come from the LPCF itself.lm° In
essence, the state expends no money for compensation awards or for
the administration of the fund. With these considerations in mind, it
is difficult to envision the LPCF as a purely "state-run" fund when
the Louisiana legislature has statutorily recognized that all monies ex-
pended for awards and administrative costs exist as private funds.
As an additional consideration, the 1990 amendments to the Act do
not amend this section in any way. The fund remains recognized by
the Louisiana legislature as a private fund. Additionally, the legislature
made no changes in the way the fund pays for administration, collection,
or protection. In other words, the mechanics of the Act remain essentially
the same. Only the functions formerly delegated to the Attorney General
and the Commissioner of Insurance have been shifted to the new Over-
sight Board.
More specifically, the responsibility of appointing attorneys to defend
the fund in professional liability cases moves from the Attorney General
to the Office of Risk Management, a branch of the Division of Ad-
ministration. The administrative tasks related to the fund move from
the office of the Commissioner of Insurance to the Oversight Board.
Furthermore, while the Attorney General and the Commissioner of
Insurance remain elected by popular vote in Louisiana, history recognizes
the functions exercised by their offices as falling within the realm of
the power of the executive branch of government. Their offices exist
to enforce the laws promulgated by the Louisiana legislature. An anal-
ogous situation exists between the Attorney General of the United States
and the President and Congress of the United States. Congress passes
laws which the executive branch, of which the Attorney General's office
is a recognized member, is obligated to enforce.
99. La. R.S. 40:1299(A)(1) (Supp. 1991). This section was amended by 1988 La. Acts
No. 507, § 1.
100. La. R.S. 40:1299.44(A)(5)(a) (Supp. 1991).
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This raises another possible flaw in the logic of the Attorney Ge-
neral's argument that the amendments to the Act endanger the consti-
tutionally protected cap on damage awards for medical malpractice. If
the Division of Administration, the Attorney General, and the Com-
missioner of Insurance all form part of the executive branch of gov-
ernment in this state, then the recent amendments to the Act do nothing
more than shift the responsibility for administering and defending the
fund from one department to another within the executive branch.
Therefore, it seems difficult to envision a court declaring the cap un-
constitutional simply because of a shift of responsibility within the
executive branch.
B. Written Reasons for Medical Review Panel Findings
As previously stated, the other major change to the Act involved
the manner in which the medical review panel reports its findings. Prior
to the 1990 amendments to the Act, the medical review panel simply
issued its expert opinions in writing. The panelists then signed the written
expert opinion. 10 The amendments, however, impose upon panel mem-
bers the new requirement that they issue written reasons for their con-
clusions which must accompany their written expert opinions. 02
While this change will probably not impact the constitutionality of
the medical malpractice monetary award cap or the constitutionality of
the medical review panel process, it does raise interesting possibilities.
Since the findings of the panel remain admissible in any subsequent
court proceeding, one can assume that the written reasons accompanying
the panel's findings will also be admissible. Although the Act provides
that the panel's findings do not determine the ultimate issue of whether
malpractice exists in any given case, jurors may find themselves per-
suaded, for better or worse, by the written reasons accompanying the
expert opinion of the panel. As such, practitioners, whether prosecuting
or defending a medical malpractice action, should consider this possi-
bility.
As a possible solution to this potential problem, practitioners should
consider requesting a limiting instruction from the court if the court
deems the written reasons accompanying the expert opinion of the panel
admissible. 03 By making the request for a limiting instruction pursuant
101. La. R.S. 40:1299.47(G) (Supp 1991).
102. Id.
103. Louisiana Code of Evidence Article 105 states:
When evidence which is admissible as to one party or for one purpose but not
admissible as to another party or for another purpose is admitted, the court,
upon request, shall restrict the evidence to its proper scope and instruct the
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to the Code of Evidence, counsel would not challenge the admissibility
of the written reasons issued by the panel. It would provide an avenue,
however, for bringing to the jury's attention the fact that these reasons,
though issued by a panel of medical professionals, should not dominate
the jury's determination of the existence or absence of an act of medical
malpractice.
V. CONCLUSION
The United States Supreme Court, in its decision in Fein v. Per-
manente Medical Group, has impliedly decided that caps on non-eco-
nomic losses from acts of medical malpractice do not violate the equal
protection or due process clauses of the United States Constitution.
Therefore, the importance of how individual states address this issue
based upon the protections granted under individual state constitutions
is greatly enhanced.
Although Louisiana jurisprudence on this topic remains somewhat
confusing, the statutorily imposed limitation on monetary damage awards
for acts of medical malpractice appears to presently enjoy constitutional
protection. The 1990 amendments to the Medical Malpractice Act make
it possible, although unlikely, that the constitutionally protected cap on
such damage awards may fall due to shifts in the administration and
defense of the fund. However, the retirement of Chief Justice Dixon
makes it somewhat difficult to predict how a Louisiana Supreme Court
of a different composition would view the amendments and the Act in
general.
The protection of the medical review panel seems to be on a more
stable constitutional ground, and a subsequent finding holding the proc-
ess unconstitutional would be surprising. However, recent amendments
to the Act impose an affirmative duty on the medical review panel to
issue written reasons to accompany any expert opinions it issues. While
these changes will probably not endanger the constitutionality of the
medical review panel process, the evidentiary questions they raise may
present unique and challenging situations for attorneys to address.
Randall B. Keiser
jury accordingly. Failure to restrict the evidence and instruct the jury shall not
constitute error absent a request to do so.
La. Code Evid. art. 105.
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